Public-records explainer · Village of Indiantown / Martin County

Let’s Look at That FPL Tax Base

Taxable value, taxes paid, and money the Village actually keeps are not the same thing. The gap between those three numbers is where a multi-billion-dollar utility extracts leverage — and where elected officials either capture public value or give it back.

THIS ARTICLE IS EXPANDED FROM MS. MELISSA HAQUES ORIGINAL EXPOSURE OF THE SAME, Compiled from Village budgets, audited financials, workshop slides, Council agenda items, and contemporaneous reporting. Figures labeled documented come from Village or County records. Figures labeled derived are calculated from those records (shown). This is an explainer, not a legal opinion.

1. The three numbers that get collapsed

When someone says “FPL is the tax base” or “FPL pays for the Village,” three different facts are being treated as one:

1. Taxable value. What the Property Appraiser puts on the roll. In Indiantown this number is enormous because Florida Power & Light parks hundreds of millions of dollars of equipment and inventory inside Village limits. Staff presentations put Tangible Personal Property at roughly 83–86 percent of Village taxable value — versus about 6 percent in Stuart and 5.5 percent in Ocean Breeze. documented
2. Taxes paid. What FPL writes a check for, across every taxing authority: Village, County, school board, and any MSTUs. This is a real outflow from FPL. It is not the same as what the Village treasury keeps.
3. Money retained. What remains in the Village General Fund after the incentive agreement sends a negotiated percentage back to FPL, and after franchise-fee collections — which come off customer electric bills — are counted as “FPL-related revenue.”

Collapse those three and a rebate looks like a contribution. Keep them separate and the rebate looks like what it is: a contractual refund of public tax collections to a private utility, granted because the utility can move inventory and the Village cannot move the grid.

2. Terms, with no euphemisms

Tangible Personal Property (TPP). Florida law (s. 192.001(11)(d), F.S.) defines it as goods, chattels, and other articles of value capable of manual possession, whose chief value is intrinsic to the article itself — machinery, equipment, tools, inventory, servers, transformers, spare parts. It is not the land. It is not the building. It is the stuff inside and the stock that can be loaded onto a truck.

Real property tax. The levy on land and buildings. Separate from TPP. The Village TPP incentive does not refund this slice. Any honest “total FPL contribution” has to include it. Any honest “what the rebate costs us” does not get to pretend real-property tax is part of the refund.

Incentive agreement / TPP grant. Not a tax exemption on the roll. FPL first pays the TPP tax. The government then writes a check, or books an expenditure, returning an agreed percentage of the qualifying tax. The Village books this as “Grants & Aides” / “TPP Tax Incentive Grant.” In the FY2026 General Fund it is a budgeted outflow of $794,630. documented

Qualifying TPP. Only the personal property covered by the contract. The 2023 Village request began with FPL’s Central Distribution Facility (parcel 1000-6002-7823) and was amended to add the Indiantown Co-gen site (parcel 1000-60035558). Coverage is not automatic for every FPL pole, substation, or future data-center hall inside Village limits. That distinction is the live legal question for the PUD.

Franchise fee. A local charge for the utility’s use of public rights-of-way. FPL collects it from customers inside the Village and remits it. Florida’s collection rule is explicit: when a municipality charges a franchise fee, the utility may collect that fee only from customers receiving service in that municipality, and may not bury it inside base rates. It is Village residents and businesses paying. FPL is the collection agent. documented

Millage. The tax rate per $1,000 of taxable value. The Village held 1.6304 mills for years after incorporation, then adopted 1.8250 for FY2025 and kept 1.8250 for FY2026. Because TPP dominates the roll, a millage change hits FPL’s equipment bill first — unless a rebate contract is written to blunt that hit. documented

Economic-development ad valorem exemption (Art. VII, s. 3 / s. 196.1995, F.S.). A different legal tool. Requires voter referendum, then ordinance, then case-by-case Council approval, typically tied to job creation. Indiantown voters rejected authorizing it on August 12, 2025, 84 yes / 242 no. The FPL TPP grant does not use this statute. It uses a Village-created grant program from 2018. That is why a “no” vote did not automatically kill the FPL rebate — and why calling the rebate “what the voters wanted” is false. documented

3. How TPP tax actually works

Florida does not tax TPP at the state level. Counties and cities do. Businesses file a TPP return (DR-405) with the Property Appraiser. There is a standard $25,000 TPP exemption if the return is timely. Everything above that is taxable at each local millage that applies to the parcel’s location.

For a utility warehouse, the taxable pile is transformers, cable, meters, vehicles not separately classified, spare generation parts, and — if a data center arrives — racks, chillers, switchgear, generators, and the short-life equipment that gets ripped out and replaced every few years.

Two properties of TPP make it a leverage instrument:

• It is large. In a small municipality that hosts a regional utility depot, TPP can dwarf houses. Indiantown staff have said as much in public: raise the millage and “the bulk of the individuals that are impacted” are TPP payers, “primarily FPL.”
• It can leave. Land cannot drive to Collier County. A pallet of inventory can. In 2025 staff attributed a 4.5 percent drop in Village taxable value to about $200 million of inventory coming off the Market Street storage facility. That single operational decision moved the roll more than ordinary residential growth can replace in a year. documented

That combination — size plus mobility — is the opening bid in every negotiation described below.

4. How franchise fees actually work

A franchise fee is rent for the streets. The Village lets FPL use public rights-of-way. In exchange, FPL remits a percentage of applicable electric revenues collected inside the Village.

The FY2026 Village budget books $470,000 in “Franchise Fees–Electricity.” The same budget document describes the source as fees collected from FPL on the electricity charged to its customers. FY2024 audited statements show franchise-fee revenue of $486,043. documented

Three facts follow, and none of them are exotic:

1. If Village customers use less power, franchise revenue falls. If FPL’s rates rise, franchise revenue can rise without FPL becoming more “generous.”
2. The people paying the fee are the same people who are told FPL “supports the Village.”
3. Comparing $470,000 in franchise remittances to $794,630 in TPP rebate outflows is not a stretch. For FY2026, the budgeted check back to FPL is larger than the budgeted franchise-fee line. documented

5. Anatomy of Indiantown’s tax base

The Village is a small residential municipality sitting on top of a utility warehouse. That is not an insult. It is the fiscal design.

Source: Village millage / budget workshop decks (FY2025 and FY2026). Percentages vary slightly by year as inventory moves.

Staff have also noted that in 2018 the Village represented about 10.8 percent of Martin County’s tax base; by 2025 that share was about 5.9 percent. Incorporation did not make Indiantown a diversified city. It made a TPP-heavy roll into a municipal general fund. documented

FY2026 General Fund context:

• General Fund total: $7,989,710
• Budgeted ad valorem: $4,108,310 (about 51 percent of General Fund revenue), on a certified taxable value of $2,356,566,750, a 4.7 percent decline from the prior year
• TPP incentive grant expenditure: $794,630 — about 10–11 percent of General Fund uses in workshop slides
• Electric franchise fees: $470,000

Audited statements for the year ended September 30, 2025 state that general-government expenses rose about $1.16 million, or 37 percent, “primarily due to increase in Tangible Personal Property Tax Incentive Grant expense and higher payroll expense and contractual services.” The rebate is not a rounding error. It is large enough to show up in the MD&A as a cause of spending growth. documented

6. The 55 percent machine

Under the current Village arrangement, the Village refunds 55 percent of FPL’s qualifying Village TPP tax on the covered properties.

Apply that rate to the FY2026 budgeted rebate:

The same arithmetic on a proposed FY2027 rebate of $816,950 produces qualifying tax of $1,485,364 and Village retention of $668,414. Those FY2027 rebate and qualifying-tax figures should be confirmed against the adopted FY2027 book when it is final. The method will not change unless the percentage changes.

What the 55 percent does not refund:

• Village real-property tax on FPL land and buildings
• School-board millage
• County millage, except to the extent a separate County incentive covers it
• TPP that is not “qualifying” under the named parcels / covered assets

FPL is not tax-exempt. FPL has a negotiated discount on one slice of one government’s levy.

7. The documented dollar trail

Village records and budgets show TPP incentive amounts in this range:

Summing those seven figures produces about $4.69 million returned or budgeted to be returned from FY2021 through proposed FY2027. Treat the total as an order-of-magnitude public-records finding, not a single audited “FPL refund” account. The direction and scale are not in doubt. The last dollar of the early years should be tied to the exhibit before the number is used in an affidavit.

Two budget facts sit next to that total:

• The FY2026 rebate is classified as money going out of the Village budget, not as additional revenue coming in. Calling $794,630 “FPL support” inverts the accounting.
• FY2023 proposed budget materials already listed a TPPG Tax Incentive Grant to FPL of $450,000 as a planned use. This is a standing feature of Village finance, not a one-year anomaly.

8. Two governments, two incentive deals

FPL did not get one discount. It stacked them.

Martin County — 2018

On November 20, 2018, the Martin County Commission voted 4–1 (Heard dissenting) to extend a five-year Tangible Personal Property Grant to FPL to keep the Indiantown storage facility. Contemporaneous reporting said the deal would slash more than $10 million from County coffers over the term, including about $2.5 million from Fire-Rescue. documented

Structure, as described then by County Administrator Taryn Kryzda:

• 55 percent reduction, first year, County General Fund
• 55 percent reduction, Parks & Recreation MSTU (on the theory the warehouse does not use the park system)
• 50 percent reduction, Fire Rescue MSTU — after FPL reviewed the County’s draft and came back asking to include Fire

The County deal was renegotiated in the shadow of Indiantown’s incorporation and the Village’s request to dissolve the CRA that had housed the warehouse. FPL’s representative said the company had not taken “our $185 million and [gone] to Collier County,” had found “a couple hundred million more of inventory,” spent “a couple million” on improvements, and wanted a “level playing field.” documented

Note the personnel continuity: the County Administrator who explained the 2018 County rebate to commissioners is the same official who, as Village Manager, later explained the Village rebate to the Village Council.

Village of Indiantown — 2018 program, 2023 FPL contract

Resolution 044-2018 created the Village Tangible Personal Property Tax Incentive Grant Program (TPPG). Resolution 053-2018 revised the guidelines. Those resolutions created a Village-wide mechanism. They did not, by themselves, say “give FPL 55 percent.”

FPL then applied. FPL’s written request went to Village Manager Taryn Kryzda and asked for a new five-year TPP grant for 2024–2028 equal to 55 percent of the TPP tax paid to the Village, described as having been “negotiated with the Village of Indiantown.” Council and the Village Attorney had to approve it.

The item came before Council on August 10, 2023 as “Approval of Tangible Personal Property Tax Incentive Grant Program Agreement,” covering the Central Distribution Facility. It came back on October 12, 2023 as an amended agreement adding the Indiantown Co-gen site. Council approved the amendment.

That sequence matters. A general program plus a company-drafted percentage plus an amendment that expands the covered footprint is how a temporary warehouse incentive becomes a standing utility discount on multiple industrial parcels.

9. How the Village deal was made — and what staff said it was for

In a July 25, 2024 Village budget workshop, Council asked what would happen to FPL if the Village increased millage. According to the compilation of that record:

• Kryzda said FPL had indicated it could move materials/inventory to Collier County, where millage was lower, and that this was why the Village entered the TPP rebate program — to keep FPL’s tax burden at a competitive level.
• Village Attorney Wade Vose reinforced the explanation: the TPP rebate would “shield” or “ameliorate” FPL from the Village’s millage increase.

Whether every quoted verb is perfect is a reason to pull the workshop audio and put the transcript in the appendix. The policy meaning does not depend on a single verb. Staff’s public theory of the deal is:

That theory has a factual core and a political payload.

The factual core: inventory did move. A $200 million swing is not a hypothetical. A depot that serves a multi-county utility system can be restocked from somewhere else.

The political payload: once Council accepts that FPL’s effective rate must be managed separately from everyone else’s, FPL has a veto on the only tax rate the Village actually controls. Millage becomes a residential instrument. The largest payer is on a side contract.

10. The leverage model: mobility vs. captivity

Call the thing by its name. This is not “partnership.” It is a bilateral monopoly with unequal exit options.

FPL’s negotiating trick is to point at the one asset that is mobile — inventory — and collect a discount as if the immobile assets were also at risk of leaving. The warehouse threat is real enough to be useful. It is not real enough to justify treating the entire FPL footprint as a flight risk.

The Village’s unused leverage sits in the other column: franchise terms, right-of-way conditions, site-plan conditions, PUD conditions, noise and water rules, and the simple refusal to rebate TPP on assets that cannot leave. Those are public powers. They were not the starting point of the 2023 deal. FPL’s ask was.

11. The millage shield

This is the mechanism that turns a warehouse rebate into a structural privilege.

When Council raises millage, every homestead, rental house, and small shop pays more. FPL’s qualifying TPP bill also rises — and then 55 percent of the increase on the covered slice is refunded. The rebate is a shock absorber bolted to one taxpayer.

Vose’s reported language is the clean description: the agreement “shields” or “ameliorates” FPL from a millage increase. If that is the legal effect, then:

• Residents absorb millage as a price.
• FPL absorbs millage as a reimbursable event.
• Staff can tell Council that raising millage is “mostly a TPP problem, primarily FPL,” while the contract simultaneously prevents the Village from collecting the full FPL share of that increase.

The circularity is the point. FPL’s size on the roll is used to argue that millage increases are dangerous. The rebate is used to make sure millage increases are not dangerous to FPL. Danger is reserved for the people who cannot get a side letter.

12. What “FPL pays for the Village” leaves out

A complete FY2026 picture, using only what can be stood up from Village books plus the 55 percent identity, looks like this:

An honest sentence is available:

FPL is the dominant assessed-value taxpayer in Indiantown. On the TPP slice the Village chose to cover by contract, the Village keeps 45 cents of each Village-millage dollar. Separate from that, Village customers send the Village about $470,000 a year through FPL bills. Land and buildings are taxed and not refunded under this program. School and County levies are separate. None of that is the same as “FPL pays for the Village.”

The dishonest sentence is shorter, which is why it travels.

13. The Community Trust is not this money

Do not let a defender of the rebate change the subject to the Indiantown Community Trust.

In July 1991, Martin County entered a PUD for the Indiantown Cogeneration Project. At first building permit, Indiantown Cogeneration L.P. deposited $1 million into a trust. Interest has accrued since October 21, 1992. On May 24, 2018, Village Resolution 23-2018 accepted transfer of the Trust to the Village. Annual awards are paid from interest — on the order of about $130,000 available in a recent cycle — to local nonprofits and community projects. documented

That money:

• is not FPL TPP tax,
• is not the 55 percent rebate,
• was not paid under the 2023 grant agreement,
• and does not offset the $794,630 going out in FY2026.

It is a 1990s coal-plant mitigation remnant. Using it as proof that “FPL gives back” in 2026 is category error, and if it is deployed that way in public comment it should be corrected on the spot.

14. Voters already answered a related question

On August 12, 2025, Village voters rejected authorization for the constitutional economic-development ad valorem exemption, 84 to 242. That tool would have let Council exempt up to 100 percent of new improvements and added TPP for qualifying job-creating businesses, for a limited term, with ordinance-level discretion and clawbacks. Mayor Dipaolo supported it as a way to attract large employers. Residents said no. documented

Two legal tracks now sit side by side:

• Track A — rejected. Voter-authorized, job-conditioned, time-limited exemptions under Art. VII / s. 196.1995. Transparent enough that it had to go on a ballot.
• Track B — still live. Staff-administered TPP grant program created by 2018 resolution, used in 2023 to give FPL a 55 percent refund without a referendum, without a job floor, and with inventory-retention as the stated public purpose.

A government that loses Track A at the ballot and quietly runs Track B for its largest utility is not “using every tool.” It is routing the same economic transfer through the door voters cannot lock.

15. The data-center and substation capture

This is why the rebate is not a completed historical story. It is a template.

FPL owns the annexed Tesoro / successor acreage now inside the Village, with Light Industrial / PUD entitlement capacity that the public has treated as a data-center play. FPL also builds substations. Hyperscale load is a TPP event: the building is expensive, the contents are more expensive, and the contents turn over.

If the 2018 program plus the 2023 contract logic is extended to new halls and new substations, the capture sequence is predictable:

1. Entitlement first. Annexation and land-use conversion lock the industrial use in. Opposition is framed as anti-jobs or anti-tax-base.
2. Value announcement second. A large TPP number is presented as “new money for the Village.” Staff can say “at least an additional half million,” as Kryzda did when the Mayor asked about annexation financials. That number is not a net-of-rebate, net-of-service-cost, net-of-impact figure. It is an opening press number.
3. Rebate third. The operator, or FPL as landlord/utility, applies under the existing TPPG program — no new referendum required — and asks for the same 55 percent, or more, because Collier or another county will allegedly take the servers.
4. Millage shield fourth. If the Village later needs money for roads, water, or the externalities the campus creates, raising millage mostly hits the people who do not have a grant agreement.
5. Footprint export fifth. A substation in the Village can serve a load outside the Village. Indiantown keeps the noise, the security lighting, the industrial aesthetic, and possibly a rebated TPP bill. Another jurisdiction keeps the hosted value.

Data centers are sold as diversification. They diversify only if the new value is kept and if the service costs and nuisances are priced. A rebate-heavy TPP structure on a roll that is already 85 percent TPP is not diversification. It is concentration with better public-relations furniture.

The August 2025 “no” vote is the public’s available instruction: do not give away the new TPP. The existing FPL contract is the available loophole: give it away under a 2018 program that never went back to the voters.

16. Pitfall and opportunity for the elected

The pitfall

Elected officials are offered a deal that feels like statesmanship and books like dependence.

• Headline value without net cash. A council member can point at a multi-billion-dollar corporation and a giant taxable-value number. The rebate line is on page 40 of the budget. Voters see the ribbon. Staff see the outflow.
• Fear of being the one who “lost FPL.” Inventory flight is a real, measurable event. That makes the threat usable even when it is over-applied. No member wants to be blamed for a 4.5 percent roll drop in an election year.
• Staff continuity as substitute for a public bargain. The same professional who structured the County discount later structured the Village discount. Institutional memory is not independent review. It is how a 2018 script survives a 2023 council and a 2025 electorate.
• Ethics and appearance. FPL sits in the local economic-development conversation, funds civic life, and needs Village votes on land use. A standing tax-refund contract plus a pending industrial PUD is the definition of a relationship that must be over-documented, not under-discussed. Chapter 112 does not forbid incentives. It does forbid treating a conflicted process as if it were ordinary vendor management.
• The shield becomes a habit. Once FPL is protected from millage, the next large TPP payer will ask why it is not. Data-center operators shop counties on that question. Officials who start with 55 percent for a warehouse will be asked for 70 percent for a hall.

The opportunity

Council still holds the only things FPL cannot pick up and drive away: zoning, PUD conditions, franchise terms, noise and water rules, and the decision whether Track B stays open.

• Sunlight the contract. Put the executed 2023 agreement, the October amendment, FPL’s request letter, the grant-calculation worksheets, and the covered-asset list online as a single packet. If the deal is defensible, it can survive daylight.
• Fence the program. Amend the TPPG guidelines so warehouse inventory retention is not a precedent for generation sites, substations, or third-party data-center equipment. Write “no rebate on assets that cannot relocate” in English.
• Price the PUD separately. Any data-center or substation approval should carry its own fiscal exhibit: gross TPP, Village millage yield, proposed rebate if any, real-property yield, franchise and utility-fee effects, water and wastewater capital, and a 20-year net. If the net is thin, the vote is a donation.
• Use the ballot result. Residents rejected Track A. Officials who then expand Track B for the same class of taxpayer are not interpreting the voters. They are going around them.
• Reopen on a date certain. Five-year grants expire. Expiration is leverage. Treating renewal as ministerial is how capture becomes permanent.

17. Pitfall and opportunity for the people

The pitfall

Residents are told they live in a town a Fortune-class utility “supports.” The household-level reality is closer to this:

• They pay electric bills that include a franchise remittance to the Village.
• They pay Village millage that FPL’s covered TPP does not pay at the same effective rate.
• They live with the industrial consequences of a utility depot, a former coal plant, new substations, and a proposed data-center landscape.
• They were asked, once, whether to authorize a broader tax-break regime, and they said no — after which the old regime kept running.
• When inventory leaves, the Village talks about raising millage or cutting services. When inventory stays, the Village writes a refund check. Either way the household is the residual claimant.

That is the definition of being on the wrong side of a leverage bargain. The public provides the streets, the land-use map, the quiet rural night, the water system, and the political permission. The firm provides a taxable pile it can thin at will, and collects rent on that threat.

The opportunity

The public’s remaining power is procedural and political, and it is not small if it is used:

• Public records. DR-405 filings, grant worksheets, FPL correspondence to the Manager, franchise agreement text and percentage, parcel-level real-property bills for the distribution facility and Cogen site, and any draft TPP application tied to new substations or the PUD.
• Budget hearings. The rebate is a General Fund expenditure. It can be questioned as a line item every year, not only when a land-use fight is hot.
• Conditions, not vibes. If Council will not kill the program, the public can still demand parcel limits, a relocation clawback (rebate plus interest if inventory is moved within X years), job or local-procurement metrics, and a ban on assigning the rebate to a data-center tenant.
• Do not accept the merged talking point. Franchise fee ≠ property tax. Community Trust ≠ TPP grant. Taxable value ≠ cash kept. County deal ≠ Village deal. Warehouse inventory ≠ substation ≠ server hall. Every merge is a capture technique.

18. Questions that belong on the record

1. Produce the executed August 2023 TPP grant agreement, the October 2023 amendment, FPL’s written request to the Village Manager, and the current covered-asset schedule.
2. Is any FPL substation now inside Village limits on that schedule? Will any substation built to serve Tesoro / successor load be added by staff action or by a new Council vote?
3. Does “qualifying TPP” follow the parcel, the owner, or the use? If a data-center tenant places servers on FPL land, who applies for the grant?
4. Show the worksheet that turns FPL’s Village TPP bill into the $794,630 FY2026 payment.
5. What is FPL’s Village real-property tax, parcel by parcel, for the distribution facility, the Cogen site, transmission parcels, and the annexed acreage — with no TPP mixed in?
6. What is the franchise-fee percentage in the current FPL–Village franchise ordinance or agreement, and what revenues are in the base?
7. If Council raises millage by 0.2 mills, what is FPL’s incremental Village TPP bill and what increment is refunded under the contract?
8. What happens in 2028 when the five-year grant lapses? Is renewal assumed?
9. Why was inventory-retention treated as a sufficient public purpose when the voter-facing exemption statute requires jobs?
10. Will the Village Attorney state, in writing, whether the rebate is intended to shield FPL from millage increases?

Those ten questions do not require anyone to hate electricity. They require the people who signed the deal to describe it in net terms.

19. Sources and method

Documented in Village financials and budget books

• Village of Indiantown FY2025–2026 Adopted Budget: General Fund $7,989,710; ad valorem $4,108,310 on certified value $2,356,566,750; Grants & Aides / TPP Tax Incentive Grant $794,630; Franchise Fees–Electricity $470,000; narrative that the General Fund supports “the Tangible Personal Property (TPP) payment to Florida Power Light (FPL).”
• FY2026 budget workshop slides: TPP grant rebate $794,630; Grants (TPP) as 11% of a General Fund snapshot; millage history and TPP share of the roll.
• Village audited financial statements, year ended Sept. 30, 2025: franchise fees $493,748 (FY2025) / $486,043 (FY2024); MD&A stating general-government expense growth driven in part by the TPP incentive grant.
• Staff millage decks: Village TPP share 83.65%–86%; comparison municipalities; 4.5% taxable-value decline in 2025 tied to inventory leaving the storage facility; millage 1.6304 held from 2019, later 1.8250.
• Indiantown Community Trust program materials: 1991 Cogen PUD origin; $1 million deposit; 2018 transfer by Resolution 23-2018.

Documented in reporting and public meetings

• Hometown News, Dec. 6, 2018, “Martin cautiously agrees to FP&L discount”: 4–1 vote, >$10 million County cost over five years, 55/55/50 structure, Kryzda as County Administrator, FPL Collier/inventory remarks.
• WQCS, Aug. 14, 2025: Village referendum on economic-development ad valorem exemption failed 84–242.
• Village Council discussion, Jan. 2026 packet / minutes context: Manager estimate of “at least an additional half million” from FPL annexation financials.

Legal framework

• s. 192.001(11)(d), F.S. — TPP definition.
• Art. VII, s. 3, Fla. Const., and s. 196.1995, F.S. — economic-development ad valorem exemptions after referendum.
• Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-30.050 (collection principle for municipal franchise fees: charged to customers in the jurisdiction, not buried in base rates).
• s. 166.021 / local economic-development expenditure authority (public purpose to attract and retain businesses) — the statutory door the TPP grant walks through, as distinct from the constitutional exemption door.

Method rules used here

• Budgeted rebate ÷ 0.55 = implied qualifying Village TPP tax. Labeled derived.
• FY2021–FY2022 annual rebate figures and FY2027 $816,950 follow the public compilation that prompted this explainer; they should be stapled to the corresponding budget page before use in sworn filings.
• July 25, 2024 workshop attributions (Collier threat; “shield” / “ameliorate”) follow that same compilation and should be confirmed to audio before they are quoted as official transcript.
• No attempt is made here to net FPL’s total multi-jurisdiction tax bill. That requires the tax roll, not the Village General Fund.